

A LOOK INTO 30 YEARS OF MALWARE DEVELOPMENT FROM A SOFTWARE METRICS PERSPECTIVE

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OVERVIEW

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- ▶ The malware problem
 - By the numbers: 1.7B known malware samples, 317M new samples discovered in 2014 (Symantec, 2015)
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 - By the numbers: 1.7B known malware samples, 317M new samples discovered in 2014 (Symantec, 2015)
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- ▶ Increasing access to malware source code
- ▶ What can we learn from it?
 - This work: **measurements** of malware as a software product and its evolution over the last 30 years

OUTLINE OF THE TALK

1. Software metrics
2. Our dataset
3. Analysis
4. Conclusions

SOFTWARE METRICS

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- SLOC (Source Lines Of Code)
 - FP (Function Points)
- ↔ "Backfiring"

Programming language	SLOC/FP	Programming language	SLOC/FP
ASP / ASP.Net	69	Java	53
Assembly	119	Javascript	47
Shell / DOS Batch	128	PHP	67
C	97	Pascal	90
C#	54	Python	24
C++	50	SQL / make	21
HTML / CSS / XML / XSLT	34	Visual Basic	42

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$$E = a_b (\text{KLOC})^{b_b}$$

$$D = c_b E^{d_b}$$

$$P = \frac{E}{D}$$

Software Project	a_b	b_b	c_b	d_b
Organic	2.4	1.05	2.5	0.38
Semi-detached	3.0	1.12	2.5	0.35
Embedded	3.6	1.20	2.5	0.32

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 - McCabe's Cyclomatic Complexity
 - No. linearly independent paths in the CFG
 - Should be <10 for each module
 - Maintainability Index (MI)
 - Value in $[0, 100]$
 - Used by Visual Studio, JSComplexity, Radon
 - Not agreed upon thresholds (e.g., VS flags $MI < 20$)


OUR DATASET

- ▶ 151 samples of malware source code collected over several months in 2015
- ▶ Sources:
 - ▶ Malware collection sites (e.g., VX Heaven)
 - ▶ Github
 - ▶ Classical e-zines (e.g., 29A)
 - ▶ Other malware exchange forums available on the web
- ▶ Original collection contained 210 samples but around 30% didn't survive:
 - ▶ Turned out to be fake
 - ▶ Couldn't be compiled & tested

OUR DATASET

Year	No. samples
1975	1
1982	1
1985-1994	28 (~18.5%)
1995-2005	94 (~62.3%)
2006-2015	27 (~17.8%)

Category	No. samples
Viruses	92
Worms	33
Trojans	11
RATs	9
MacroViruses	3
Botnets	3




ANALYSIS

Source code analytics	Number of files
	SLOC count
	Density of comments
	FP count
	Programming languages
Cost estimates	Effort
	Development time
	Team size
Code quality	Complexity
	Maintainability
Comparison with regular software	


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Sample	Year	E	D	P
Anthrax	1990	1.20	2.68	0.45
Batvir	1994	0.53	1.97	0.27
AIDS	1999	0.31	1.59	0.19
IISWorm	1999	0.55	1.99	0.28
ILOVEYOU	2000	0.58	2.03	0.29
Blaster	2003	1.97	3.24	0.61
Mydoom	2004	11.13	6.25	1.78
Sasser	2004	3.03	3.81	0.80
Zeus	2007	242.85	20.15	12.05
GhostRAT	2007	126.45	15.73	8.04
Tinba	2014	53.13	11.31	4.70
Dendroid	2014	50.20	11.07	4.53



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Software	Version	Year	SLOC	E	D	P	FP	M	CR	MI
Snort	2.9.8.2	2016	46,526	135.30	16.14	8.38	494.24	3.31	10.32	63.27
Bash	4.4 rc-1	2016	160,890	497.81	26.47	18.81	2,265.35	3.40	17.08	52.42
Apache	2.4.19	2016	280,051	890.86	33.03	26.97	4,520.10	3.02	23.42	61.56
IPtables	1.6.0	2015	319,173	1,021.97	34.80	29.37	3,322.05	3.06	27.33	68.88
Git	2.8	2016	378,246	1,221.45	37.24	32.80	4,996.44	3.37	12.15	41.84
Octave	4.0.1	2016	604,398	1,998.02	44.89	44.51	11,365.09	2.52	27.69	52.42
ClamAV	0.99.1	2016	714,085	2,380.39	47.98	49.61	10,669.97	2.79	33.57	63.87
Cocos2d-x	3.10	2016	851,350	2,863.02	51.47	55.63	16,566.78	2.96	17.55	66.60
gcc	5.3	2015	6,378,290	2,3721.97	114.95	206.37	90,278.41	2.10	31.24	50.57

CONCLUSIONS

- ▶ Numerical evidence of how malware has become increasingly complex over the last 30 years:
 - Increments of approx. a factor of 10 per decade in number of files, SLOC and FP counts.
 - Development costs: from small projects of 1 person working 1-2 months to larger programming teams working 6-8 months (and more).
 - Largest malware samples similar in complexity to small benign products.
 - No significant difference in terms of code quality.

CONCLUSIONS

- ▶ Potential limitations:
 - Software metrics, really?
 - Dataset quality
- ▶ Ongoing work:
 - Extended dataset
 - Code sharing
 - Authorship attribution

THANKS!